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ABSTRACT
With Blu-ray Disc ("BD") and HD-DVD poised to take over the $24.6 billion home video
market, the issue of copy protection is the most significant obstacle to overcome before this
new technological era can be fully ushered in. This comment proposes that impending
Advanced Access Content System ("AACS") implementation and Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA") enforcement are not effective remedies for protecting copyrighted material and
curbing rampant piracy in connection with BD and HD-DVD. Limiting the proposed scope of
the DMCA, rejecting analog hole legislation, and creating low cost digital marketplace
alternatives to illicit activity are the best ways to address this problem.
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REGULATING HIGH-DEFINITION CONTENT AND ASSOCIATED ANTI-PIRACY
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TIMOTHY M. CHO*

INTRODUCTION

"The Internetis a vector for piracy... We 'l never be able to win the battle against
piracy.... It's an arms race."
Tom Munro, CEO of Verametrix, a San Diego company that focuses on IP
content security. 1
"The movie studios boycotted TVbecause they thought it would clean out the movie
theaters. Then they complained that the remote control would make it too easy to
skip commercials. Then they freaked out over the VCR, saying it was the Boston

Strangler'of the American film industry."
2
Cory Doctorow, Electronic Frontier Foundation.

The next generation of high definition home entertainment is now upon us. The

advent of Blu-ray Disc ("BD") and HD-DVD has ushered in a new era, destined to
take over the $24.6 billion home video market. 3 Although retailers have already
released a number of BD and HD-DVD players, recorders, and movies to the

consumer market, the issue of copy protection is the most significant obstacle in
getting the technology to market. 4 U.S. movie studios lose an estimated $6.1 billion

*J.D. Candidate, May 2008, THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL. B.S. Industrial Engineering,
Northwestern University, August 2002. The author would like to thank his mother Wendy and
father Danny in New York and the rest of his family and friends in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Korea
for their love and support. He would also like to acknowledge Timothy Rechtien, Jennifer Gregory,
and the staff of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their invaluable editorial
assistance.
I David Benjamin, Hackers Winning DRM Arms Race,' EETIMES.COM, Sept. 7, 2006,
http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 192600593.
2 Craig Birkmaier, CPRRedefined,BROADCAST ENGINEERING, Apr. 1, 2006, at 14.
3 Rachel Abramowitz, A Blue Periodfor Hollywood. Studios Hope Blu-ray or Hih -Definition
DVDs Will Boost Sales in a Sagging Market, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at El, available at
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/cl-et-dvds29aug29,0,1291385.story?coll=la-homeentertainment. See generally Stephen Manes, Hot New Hi-Def DVD Players, FORBES, July 24,
2006, at 64 (noting that with the ability to store fifteen to thirty gigabytes of data in the HD-DVD
format and twenty-five to fifty gigabytes in the BD format, home video will be capable of six times
the resolution, improved audio, and other interactive features not currently available through the
standard-definition DVD format).
4 Debbie Galante Block, HD-DVD and Bin-Ray: How Fast? How Soon, EVENTDV, June 1,
2006, at 20(5).
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annually in global wholesale revenue to piracy. 5 To combat such widespread piracy
concerns, industry giants adopted a mandatory access restriction scheme known as
the Advanced Access Content System ("AACS").6
BD and HD-DVD adopted AACS as the digital rights management ("DRM")
standard enacted to prevent the unauthorized duplication of movies.7 The major
AACS copy-protection features are managed copy, digital-only token ("DOT"), imageconstraint token ("JCT"), and audio watermark.8 With consumers' interests and "fair
use" concerns in mind, many of the major studios resisted implementing or
supporting these measures. 9
Furthermore, the AACS Licensing Agency's
("AACSLA") prolonged inability to agree on final rules, conditions, and licensing
details necessary to enact a final license for AACS added to the uncertainty of its
implementation in upcoming next generation DVD systems. 10 Meanwhile, both the
Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") and the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") have publicly trumpeted the virtues of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which criminalizes the circumvention of copyprotection technology to deter piracy.11

5 Sarah McBride & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Studios See Big Rise in Estimates of Losses to Movie
Piracy,WALL ST. J., May 3, 2006, at B 1, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 11466236119
2442291.html?mod=home whats news us.
6 See Junko Yoshida, BluRa, HDDVD Reulouts Await AACS Licenses, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at 14 (discussing how Disney, Intel, Microsoft, Matsushita
(Panasonic), Warner Brothers, IBM, Toshiba, and Sony have adopted AACS for both next-generation
optical disc formats).
7 Block, supra note 4, at 20(5) (noting that AACS is similar to the original DVD's Content
Scrambling System ("CSS"), which was notably descrambled and rendered useless by several
European students); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 311
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing how Jon Johansen, a Norwegian fifteen-year old reverse engineered a
licensed DVD player and discovered the CSS encryption algorithm and keys in late September 1999,
with the help of two other teenagers he had "met" over the Internet).
8
Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14.
9 Block, supra note 4, at 20(5). The "fair use" doctrine states that use of copyrighted material
"for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for

classroom use), scholarship, or research" is not infringing. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
10Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14. While there appears to be apparent indifference on both sides
of the format war between BD and HD-DVD, the lingering delay in finalizing a license for AACS has
added even more uncertainty to the equation. Id. Although AACS has stated that an interim
license has allowed it to already incorporate the copy-protection features into chips installed inside
the devices, Yoshida comments that it is "unclear whether consumers will be willing to pay more for
copy-protected content whose transport from system to system is more restricted than ever before."
Id.
11 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
The Act was enacted in
compliance with the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty ('WIPO Treaty").
Id. See also Ken Fisher, RIAA et a]. Says CD Ripping Backups Not Fair Use, ARSTECHNICA, Feb.
15, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/ 20060215-6190.html [hereinafter Fisher, Not Fair
Use]. Fisher states that as part of its mandatory triennial review of the effectiveness of the DMCA,
major content owners, including the MPAA and RIAA, filed a joint reply with the U.S. Copyright
Office celebrating the effectiveness of the Act. Id. The content owners dismiss arguments that the
DMCA is bad law because it prevents users from making backups as "uncompelling" because "people
do not need to back up anything that does not have a high failure rate" and even if discs do become
damaged, "replacements are readily available at affordable prices." Id. But see Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling unanimously
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This comment proposes that stringent AACS implementation and DMCA
enforcement are not effective remedies for fixing the problem of rampant piracy.
Such measures primarily suffocate the fair use rights of consumers who legitimately
obtained media content. Instead, the film and technological industries should focus
their efforts and initiatives on bolstering the appeal of legitimate movie purchases by
offering low-cost alternatives to illegal conduct.
Section I provides a background explaining the specifics of the AACS copyprotection technologies and chronicles the history of the ongoing dispute between the
entertainment industry and the general consumer public. Section II provides an
analysis of the stifling effect the security measures impose upon the general, lawabiding consumer. Section III proposes a way to limit the scope of the DMCA and to
create incentives for movie studios to offer consumers low-cost alternatives to illicit
activity. Finally, Section IV concludes with two recent examples of the industry
taking steps in the right direction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. AA CS Copy-Protection Technologies
The complexities and vast array of AACS copy-protection technologies require
12
Most
consumers to educate themselves about each and choose accordingly.
consumers should be concerned with the issue of interoperability of copy-protected
13
content among various home and mobile media devices.
The managed copy scheme was intended to allow copy-protected content to
migrate seamlessly from medium to medium, without DRM concerns. 14 However, the
current managed copy scheme in place for HD-DVD requires a consumer to contact
the content owner via the Internet to find out how much it costs to make a copy of the
content in a certain resolution before obtaining permission to actually make a copy
on an HD-DVD recorder.15

consumers have a fair use right to make portable digital copies of their music recordings for their
personal use, upholding the public's right to "space-shift" copyrighted music).
12 See generally David Killick, Small-Screen Revolution.*What the Terms Mean, THE PRESS,
Sept. 6, 2006, at 4 (advising consumers to check that their equipment is compatible with the HDCP
copy protection format in the transition from analog to digital television). See also Digital Content
Protection, LLC, High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP), http://www.digital-cp.com
(last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (describing HDCP as a specification developed by the Intel Corporation to
protect digital entertainment content across the DVI/HDMI interface).
1:3Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14. Yoshida comments "[t]he industry hasn't done any plugfests to
test how all the AACS copy-protection features actually work among various products in a home" as
the term "managed copy" is intended to convey. Id.
1 E.g., id. (stating copy-protected content should be sufficiently enabled to be transported
freely from home networks to portable devices).
15 Id. (listing alternative managed-copy schemes offered to AACS LA, which include Microsoft's
Windows Media DRM, Sony's MagicGate Content Protection for Recordable Media, and the Video
Content Protection System). But ef id. (stating it is questionable whether most BD and HD-DVD
recorder manufacturers will be willing to invest the manpower and licensing fees associated with
each of these technologies).
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The image-constraint token ("ICT") flag is another proposed AACS
technology, which automatically downgrades the resolution of high-definition content
when transmitted over an analog connection. 16 As a result, ICT will require
consumers to purchase new televisions with a digital HDMI input to comply with the
High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection ("HDCP") standard. 17 Although ICT is
an optional flag easily implemented at the discretion of the content owner, most
18
major studios have not yet "burdened" discs with the technology.
The digital-only token ("DOT") flag is a similar copy-protection technology,
which completely blocks content from being streamed over an analog channel. 19
Currently, its future use is dependent upon the completion of a final AACS license
20
agreement.

B. Methods ofDefeatingDigitalCopy-Protection
This section outlines the intended purpose of blocking the delivery of non-digital,
copyrighted content, beginning with a discussion of the "analog hole" problem,
followed by a recap of recent court decisions involving enforcement of the DMCA.
This section concludes with a summary of recently proposed legislation revising the
Act.

16Id. When an ICT-enabled device detects that content is being transmitted over an analog
component video connection, as opposed to the digitally protected High-Definition Multimedia
Interface ("HDMI") connection found on most higher-end televisions, it automatically degrades the
picture from its native 1080p resolution to 540p (960 x 640 pixels), which is one-fourth of the
original resolution. Id.
See also Manes, supra note 3, at 64 (describing the "down-rezzing"
degradation effect of ICT).
17 Gerry Block, Hollywood Agrees to Postpone Image Constraint Token until 2012&." Sony,
Microsoft, and others may have cut a secret deal. Is this the consumer victory we've been hoping
for? IGN.COM, May 22, 2006, http://gear.ign.com/articles/709/709653pl.html [hereinafter Block,
HollywoodAgrees to Postpone].
18 Manes, supra note 3, at 64.
Compare Block, Next-Gen DVD Copy-Protection Debacle,
IGN.COM, Feb. 24, 2006, http://gear.ign.com/articles/691/691408pl.html (decrying the decision to
implement ICT and DOT, while eliminating "managed copy" in AACS's early stages), with Gerry
Block, Hollywood Backs OffAA CS, at Least a Little: Sony and Universal Won't Downsample Analog
Connections, IGN.COM, Mar. 27, 2006, http://gear.ign.com/articles/698/698656pl.html (reporting
Sony and Universal have announced they will not implement ICT in their earlier models, although
it is likely it will be implemented once digital connections are in "ubiquitous use"), and Block,
Hollywood Agrees to Postpone, supra note 17 (confirming the speculation that movie studios have
reached an agreement with major manufacturers, including Sony and Microsoft, to postpone ICT
implementation "until 2010 or perhaps 2012").
19 Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14 (noting the DOT flag may be optionally implemented by the
content owner, and that it may potentially be useful in releasing high-definition previews of content
before its theatrical release).
20 Denon Eyes Expanded HDMI Use, Awaits Arrival of Version 1.3 Gear, CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS DAILY, July 27, 2006.
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1. The Analog Hole Problem
The term "analog hole" refers to the process by which devices are used to
convert analog content into digital content, which may then be distributed freely to
others via the Internet. 21 The "hole" opens up when analog television owners convert
DRM-protected digital content to an analog form viewable on their televisions,
22
thereby stripping the content of all its digital protections.
Content owners argue the analog hole harms consumers, threatens business,
and enriches illegal enterprises because it creates a loophole that effectively blurs the
legal boundaries that consumers understand and choose to comply with. 23 The film
and television industries reason that law-abiding consumers are not given sufficient
and concrete guidance as to what islegally permitted because one can easily exploit
the analog hole through the use of legitimate home equipment used in a permissible
24
manner.
In 1996, a group of consumer electronics, computer, and motion pictures
industries began meeting in an open forum known as the Content Protection
Technical Working Group ("CPTWG").25 The CPTWG explores voluntary agreements
that protect digital content from unauthorized use. 26 From this forum, several
21 The Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005. Hearingon H.R. 4569 Before the HR.,
151 Cong. Rec. E. 2569 (2006) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House
Judiciary Comm.).
22 Copyright Protection and Innovation."Hearing on H.R. 4569 Before the Comm. on S.
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of Dan Glickman, Chairman and CEO, MPAA) (declaring
the analog content can be converted back to its digital form "in the clear," minus the original DRM
protection, and be easily compressed, copied, and redistributed with very little degradation of
quality). Cf CopyrightProtection and Innovation: Hearing on H.R. 4569 Before the Comm. on S.
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Chris Cookson, President, Warner Bros. Technical
Operations) (explaining that this quick and painless copying is possible because the analog output of
a digital device cannot possibly "know" whether it has been plugged into an analog television for
legitimate viewing or into a video capture card or computer for unauthorized re-digitization,
duplication, and re-transmission over the Internet).
23 Cookson, supra note 22; see also CopyrightProtection and Innovation:Hearingon HR. 4569
Before the Comm. on S Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Comm.
on S. Judiciary) (comparing the analog hole problem to the illegal sharing of content over peer-topeer networks issue).
24 Cookson, supra note 22 (stating that today's digital products that retain analog inputs
"completely blur the line of understanding" and make it confusing for consumers, necessitating a
"bright-line" to the question "can I copy?" in order to properly inform the typical law-abiding citizen);
see also Glickman, supra note 22 (concurring on Cookson's belief that "[e]ven if hackers overcome
[the copy-protection measures], this effort will be worthwhile whenever normal consumers recognize
and respect the terms of the offers they accept" because "committed pirates will break any security
measures we can [possibly] devise" and there will never be an absolute protection against
unauthorized use of copyrighted movies).
25 Cookson, supra note 22. Several agreements that have resulted from the forum include CSS,
HDCP, and Digital Transport Content Protection ("DTCP"). Id. The agreements are deemed
"voluntary" because manufacturers may themselves decide whether or not to implement them in
their devices. Id. See also Copyright Protection and Innovation:Hearing on H.R. 4569 Before the
Comm. on S. Judiciary,109th Cong. 10 (2006) (statement of Matt Zinn, Senior Vice President, Gen.
Counsel, and Chief Privacy Officer, TiVo Inc.) (stating that the CPTWG has both a proven track
record and sufficient resources to productively examine content protection technologies, given its
prior experience "vetting" CSS and the broadcast flag).
26 Cookson, supra note 22.
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industry groups convened a special study group called the Analog Reconversion
Discussion Group ("ARDG") to investigate different methods of closing the analog
hole. 27 As a result of the ARDG's studies, House Judiciary Committee Chairman
James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and Ranking Member John Conyers proposed the Digital
Transition Content Security Act ("DTCSA") on December 16, 2005.28 If enacted, the
Act would close the analog hole, mandating the use of the Analog Copy Generation
Management System ("CGMS-A") and Video Encoded Invisible Light ("VEIL")
29
Technologies Rights Assertion Mark in devices that re-digitize content.
However, device manufacturers argue staunchly against the bill, stating that it
does little to stop piracy because the studios have not demonstrated they actually
suffered any lost revenue due to the analog hole problem. 30 The bill is also accused of
infringing upon the principles of fair use by attempting to exercise too much control
over consumers' use of lawfully-acquired content. 31 Furthermore, the scope of the
27 Id.

See also Glickman, supra note 22 (noting the ACWG received active participation from

virtually every major consumer electronics and information technology company, in addition to a
number of "consumer" groups including the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), to reach an
overarching consensus as to the desired attributes of a solution to the analog hole problem).
28 Digital Transition Content Security Act, H.R. 4569, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
21) See Cookson, supra note 22 (stating that CGSMA and VEIL would effectively put the
consumer on notice that unauthorized reproduction and redistribution is strictly prohibited by law);
see also Glickman, supra note 22 (emphasizing that CGSM-A, coupled with VEIL, provides an
unadulterated customer viewing experience that introduces a "practical degree of protection from
unauthorized reproduction and redistribution);
Cf Press Release, Federal Communications
Commission, FCC ADOPTS ANTI-PIRACY PROTECTION FOR DIGITAL TV (Nov. 4, 2003) (on file
with author) (announcing that the FCC is adopting an anti-piracy mechanism known as the
"broadcast flag," which is a digital code that can be embedded into a digital broadcasting stream,
signaling the DTV reception equipment to limit the indiscriminate redistribution of digital broadcast
content).
'30
Zinn, supra note 25. "The Digital Content Transition Security Act is a solution looking for a
problem." Id. Zinn declares that the "studios have not demonstrated that the analog hole is
contributing in any way to the piracy problem" nor have they presented even a scintilla of evidence
that they have "suffered even one dollar of lost revenue as a result of the sale of contraband copies of
content made through analog-to-digital conversions." Id. Zinn argues that without such proof of the
"nature and economic impact" of a superficially-perceived problem, there is only mere speculation on

the part of the consumer electronics industry, and this cannot be the basis for such far-reaching
legislation. Id. On behalf of Tivo, Zinn argues that the proposed analog hole legislation is unlikely
to stop or even reduce piracy, because the analog hole is not the source of the overwhelming majority
of piracy acts. Id. See also Copyright Protectionand Innovation:Hearingon H.R. 4569 Before the
Comm. on S. Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Gary Shapiro, President and CEO,
Consumer Elec. Ass'n). Shapiro concurs with Zinn's statements when he also declares that there is
"little evidence that the 'analog hole' is [actually] contributing to the mass redistribution of content
over the Internet, and even less [evidence] that it is contributing to such redistribution of HDTV
content" either. Id. He cites statistics pulled directly from the MPAA's website claiming that
ninety-percent of all pirated copies actually originate from handheld camcorders in movie theaters,
while an ATT Labs study also shows that seventy-seven percent of pirated movies on peer-to-peer
networks were actually leaked by those who work in the film industry. Id.
'3lE.g., Zinn, supra note 25 (reasoning that the bill would "impose substantial costs [upon] both
manufacturers and consumers [in the form] of higher prices and reduced device functionality," while
allowing the studios to reap all the benefits at no cost to them); see also, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 30.
Shapiro discusses the policy implications of hindering the "private, noncommercial, in-home conduct
of the sort that consumers have been accustomed to for decades" (i.e. Time-shifting television
programs through the use of a VCR). Id. Shapiro expresses the CEA's desire to (1) establish "rules"
applicable across all platforms, (2) protect consumers' fair use abilities to record, store, and playback
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legislation is overbroad in covering any component or piece of software code that can
function as an analog to digital converter.3 2 Finally, the studios unilaterally selected
the VEIL watermarking technology, a technology admittedly designed for toys,
despite a failure to conduct adequate testing and to compare it to other potential
solutions.3 3 Above all, opponents of the DTCSA state that there are far better
alternatives for protecting digital content without "heavy-handed technology
mandates."

34

2. Circumvention

Although the exploitation of the analog hole can often be deemed "casual
misuse" of intellectual property because of the readily available legitimate means of
copying, the DTSCA does not intend to deter "conscious and willful use" of a
circumvention device that defeats the technical protections on a digital work.3 5 In
content for non-commercial purposes, and (3) avoid unusually harsh "impositions" on consumers,
such as "downresolution" of analog outputs. Id. Finally, Shapiro mentions the harmful effect such
arbitrary legislation could have on impeding "technological progress and U.S. competitiveness" in
the global market. Id.
'32 Shapiro, supra note 30 (reasoning that a large number of products having nothing to do with
television fall under the scope of the bill including airplanes, automobiles, medical devices, PC's, and
measurement equipment, among many others); see also Zinn, supra note 25 (stating that the

legislation proposed is merely a way for the studios to attempt to assert an unprecedented amount of
control over consumers' use of lawfully-acquired content, "all at the device manufacturer's expense").
33 Zinn, supra note 25. Zinn asserts that VEIL watermarking technology is an entirely
unproven technology that will impose substantial costs on device manufacturers. Id. Although the
ARDG identified at least nine different technologies that may be relevant to addressing the analog
hole problem, the studios unilaterally selected VEIL without any notice to the ARDG, relegating all
potential risks and costs to the manufacturers. Id. Because CGMS-A and VEIL are not "robust or
persistent signaling systems," the manufacturers will likely be found in violation of robustness rules
with no remuneration for the criminal penalties potentially assessed as a result of the resulting
legislation. Id. Thus, manufacturers will likely be forced out of the market altogether. Id. See also
Shapiro, supra, note 30 (agreeing that VEIL technology is a largely unknown entity in the consumer
electronics industry).
'3 Internet Content Protections.*
Hearing on H.R. 4861 and H.R. 1201 Before the Comm. on H.

Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 109th Cong. 1 (2006)
(statement of Gigi Sohn, President, Public Knowledge). In response to the question of whether it is
good policy to impose technological mandates that force consumers to replace their newly-purchased
devices, Sohn offered the recent MGM v. Grokstr,545 U.S. 913 (2005) decision and passage of the
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act (§ 102, 17 U.S.C. § 2319B) as reasonable alternatives to
such burdensome mandates. Id.
35 Glickman, supra note 22.
The content owners themselves concede that determined
commercial pirates will always be successful in defeating any security measure they could possibly
enact. Id. See also Cookson, supra note 22. Compare Scott Crosby, Ian Goldberg, Robert Johnson,
Dawn Song, & David Wagner, A Cryptanalysis of the High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection
System, in 2320 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE, REVISED PAPERS FROM THE ACM CCS8
WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 192, 192-200 (Tomas
Sander ed., 2001) (revealing in detail the inherent weakness in the HDCP security scheme that may
lead to "practical attacks"), with Ed Felten, HDCP Could Have Boon Bettr, Apr. 17, 2006,
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1006 [hereinafter Felten, HDCP Could Have Been BetteAd
(declaring that the entire HDCP "handshake" system is virtually certain to be broken within a few
years because the security of the design relies entirely on the secrecy of 1600 "special numbers"
which form a 40-by-40 matrix whose disclosure would allow anyone to circumvent the content-
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1998, Congress enacted the DMCA to "provide adequate legal protection and effective
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures" used by
36
copyright holders.
The DMCA contains three major provisions relating to circumvention. 37 The
first is the anti-circumvention provision contained in subsection 1201(a)(1)(A), which
"prohibits a person from 'circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under [Title 17, governing copyright]."'38 The
second and third provisions are the "anti-trafficking provisions" contained in
subsections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1), which prohibit a person from trafficking in
devices that can circumvent technologies that either entirely prevent access to a
39
copyrighted work or simply prevent copying of a work.
One of the first notable cases to seek enforcement of the DMCA was Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimercdes, where eight major U.S. motion picture studios filed
suit and sought injunctive relief against computer hackers who posted and linked a
computer program called "DeCSS," which enabled circumvention of CSS encryption,
on their websites. 40
Although the defendants argued the DMCA was
unconstitutional as applied to computer programs and there was no violation of the
Act even if it was valid, the court held the DMCA as applied to the posting and
protection measure very easily), and Ed Felten, HDCP* Why So Weak
Apr. 19, 2006,
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1007 [hereinafter Felten, Why So Weak.i. Felten concludes
his discussion on the vulnerability of HDCP by stating that HDCP's designers deliberately chose a
less-secure scheme over a more secure, standard one to enable lawsuits, not to disable pirates. Id.
HDCP's designers were given a "budget" of 10,000 "gates" with which to build the digital chips, and
were not afforded the extra 20,000 gates necessary to build a more secure cryptographic scheme,
because doing so would reduce the amount of peer-to-peer infringement in the long run. Id. Thus,
once an infringer cracks the system, the copyrights owners can sue them under the DMCA. Id.
36 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001).
Eric Corley is
viewed as a leader of the computer hacker community and publishes a magazine through his
company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc., called 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, which is widely regarded as a
bible to the hacker community. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also Fred von Lohmann, Symposium.* Protecting Content in the Digital
Environment. Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act against the Darknet: Implications
for the Regulation of Tehnological Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635, 635-38
(2004) [hereinafter Von Lohmann, Darkne (stating that the DMCA is intended to encourage
copyright owners to implement DRM technologies to protect their work and to allow them legal
recourse in the event circumvention devices are used or made available to consumers).
'37
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (2006); see also Universal, 273
F.3d at 440.
38 Universal,273 F.3d at 440.
'9 Id. at 440-41.
The DMCA contains exceptions for certain research purposes, and also
creates civil remedies and criminal sanctions, including the authorization for a court to grant
temporary and permanent injunctions in some instances. Id. See also Robert Lemos, Security
Workers: CopyrightLaw Stifles, NEWS.COM, Sept. 6, 2001, http://news.com.com/Security+workers+
Copyright+law+stifles/2100-1001_3-272716.htm1 (reporting that the threatened lawsuit of Princeton
computer-science professor Edward Felten, and the arrest and criminal indictment of Russian
encryption expert Dmitry Sklyarov at the Def Con hacking conference, has caused numerous
researchers to pull their work from websites in fear of criminal prosecution under the DMCA). See
also Lisa M. Bowman, Researchers weigh pubhlication, prosecution, NEWS.COM, Aug. 15, 2001,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-271712.html (describing the trend of foreign science researchers
shying away from attending DRM conferences in the United States due to recent copyright
crackdowns under the DMCA).
40 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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linking did not contravene the First Amendment because the predominant functional
character of computer code distinguishes it from the expressive conduct normally
protected as free speech. 41 Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive and
declaratory relief.42 The court's reasoning equated the defendants' posting and
linking of the DeCSS code as one and the same, and held that the plaintiffs
established by "clear and convincing evidence" the defendants linked to sites posting
DeCSS, knowing it was a circumvention device and a "way to get free movies" in
violation of the DMCA.43 Thus, an anti-linking injunction against plaintiffs did not
44
violate the First Amendment.
Four years later, a movie studio filed a factually similar case in Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios. 45 In this case, Paramount sued the defendant software
company, 321 Studios, under the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA for
manufacturing and selling computer software that allowed users to decode CSSencoded DVDs and thereby make identical copies of the discs. 46 Comparing
Paramountto Reimerdes, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York stated Reimerdes offered his DeCSS software for free over the Internet,
47
whereas in Paramount,the defendants offered the software for commercial sale.
However, the court held that the rule applied equally in each case and that 321
Studios violated the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA because the software
was "primarily designed and produced to circumvent CSS and was marketed to the
public for use in circumventing CSS."48 The court rejected 321 Studios' "other diverse
uses" argument and granted preliminary injunctive relief, prohibiting the
49
manufacture or distribution of DeCSS software.
Four months later, in Comcast of Illinois X, LLC v. Hightech Electronics,Inc.,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois cited Reimerdes and held
the defendants' maintenance of a website, which linked to other sites that sold illegal
41 Id.
at 328-29 (discussing how the Supreme Court has always distinguished between pure
speech, which ordinarily receives the highest level of protection, and expressive conduct for First
Amendment purposes); see also id. at 330 (stating that the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged the
expressive nature of computer code to place it within the scope of the First Amendment, but it also
recognized the functional aspect of source code in determining the governmental interest in
regulating the form of speech); id. at 335 (stating that "some expressive content in the code should
not obscure the fact of its predominant functional character it is first and foremost a means of
causing a machine with which it is used to perform particular tasks," making it sufficiently nonexpressive).
42

43

Id. at 346.
Id. at 339, 341.

4 Id. at 346. The court also held that "the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA as applied to
the posting of computer code that circumvents [security] measures," which protects copyrighted
works in digital form, is a valid exercise of Congress' authority. Id. at 332. In its analysis, it
deemed the anti-trafficking provision a "content-neutral regulation in furtherance of important
governmental interests that does not unduly restrict expressive activities." Id.
4, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03-CV-8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004).
46 Id. at *2.
47 Id. at *3; see also Universal, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (stating that "DeCSS is a free, effective
and fast means of decrypting plaintiffs' DVDs and copying them to computer hard drives.").
48 Paramount,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306, at *3.
49 Id. at *4-5. The court rejected 321's insistence that its software did not violate the DMCA
because it had "other diverse uses" such as restoring and retrieving damaged DVDs. Id.
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cable pirating devices and taught how to run an illegal pirating device business, was
enough to sustain the plaintiffs DMCA claim. 5° Thus, since any person injured from
a violation of the DMCA is permitted to bring suit pursuant to the DMCA, Comcast
successfully brought its DMCA claim on the basis of its financial injury from the
51
defendants' actions.
Two years later, in Macrovision v. Sima Produets Corp., the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York found a violation of the DMCA when the
defendant sold certain "video enhancer" products used to circumvent plaintiffs
Analog Copy Protection ("ACP") technology. 52 Although the court stated the DMCA
does provide for a limited "fair use" exception for certain users, it reasoned the
exception does not apply to manufacturers or traffickers of prohibited circumvention
devices. 53 Furthermore, the court rejected Sima's contention that "fair use" includes
the making of backup copies of copyrighted material because of a lack of authority
citing such a proposition. 54
Thus, since Sima's devices only had "limited
commercially significant purpose[s] or use[s] other than to circumvent the ACP," the
50 Comcast of Ill. X v. Hightech Elec., Inc., No. 03 C 3231, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14619, at *13, *20 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2004). The court noted that this case is similar to CSC Holdings, Inc. v.
GreenleafElees., Inc., No. 99 C 7249, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7675, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2000),
which also involved a situation where defendants linked to other websites that hosted illegal cable
descrambling devices (unauthorized DeCSS software in Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294), and thus
reasoned that a claim pursuant to the DMCA was appropriate in this case as well. Id. See also id
at *19.
The court distinguished the case from Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse
Ministry,Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D. Utah 1999) by reasoning that Hightech indeed received
compensation from the websites to which it linked. Id. Cf id. at *17 (reasoning that although
Comcast was not the copyright holder of the pirated programs on the network, the programs were
copyrighted material and Comcast controlled access to the material via descrambling methods).
51 Id. at *3 (describing the financial injury to Comcast as an "adverse impact on Comcast's
ability to maintain a high quality of programming services for its subscribers, ... increased risk of
signal leakage [in potential violation of FCC regulations].... [and] decreased franchise fees" that
Comcast would normally pay to the state of Illinois).
52 Macrovision v. Sima Prod. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 5587 (RO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22106, at *12, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2006). Defendants stated that the "video enhancer" products were
purported to be used to make "fair use" backup copies of his or her DVD collection, or to transfer
copyrighted VT-S movies to DVD. -d. at *2-3.
53 Id. at *6. The court derided Sima's defense that it only intends to enable "fair use" copying
of copyrighted works as "no defense at all" because the DMCA exception does not apply to its
prohibition of the manufacture of such circumvention devices. Id. at *7. "Fair use has never been
held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's
preferred technique or in the format of the original." Id. at *8.
54 Id. at *7-8; see Fisher, Not Fair Use, supra note 11. The RIAA categorically dismisses the
argument that backing up legitimately purchased DVDs is fair use by stating that (1) there is no
evidence that "any of the relevant media [is] "unusually subject to damage in the ordinary course of
their use," (2) the huge success of DVD sales in comparison to VHS demonstrates that any problems
there may be with the media are not significant enough to affect consumer spending habits, because
DVD sales are skyrocketing while VHS sales are not. Id. In addition to its argument that damaged
discs can be easily replaced at "affordable prices," the RIAA proceeds to disavow the notion that
copying a purchased audio CD is fair use just because such permission has "often or even 'routinely'
[been] granted." Id. See also Robin D. Gross, Court Upholds Right to DigitalMusic:RIAA Loses Bid
to Prevent Consumers from Using MP3 Music Players, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
http://www.imaginelaw.com/lawyer-attorney- 1181196.html [hereinafter Gross, Court Upholds Right
to DigitalMusic] (praising the Ninth Circuit's landmark ruling in Recording Indus. Ass n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) that upheld the public's right to
'space-shift" copyrighted music under the fair use privilege for non-commercial personal use).
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court concluded that Sima violated the DMCA to Macrovision's detriment and
55
granted preliminary injunctive relief.

3.Recent DMCA Developments
This subsection discusses two recent bills proposed within Congress concerning
the DMCA. The first bill, entitled the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act
("DMCRA"), was originally introduced in 2003 and recently re-introduced in March
2005.56 The DMCRA, if enacted, would narrow the scope of the DMCA and allow
consumers to make copies of copyrighted works they legally obtained for personal
use, in accordance with fair use principles. 5' In contrast, the second bill, entitled the
Intellectual Property Protection Act ("IPPA") of 2006, if enacted, drastically broadens
the scope of the DMCA, prohibiting the mere attempt to infringe copyrighted
material. 58
The IPPA expands the language prohibiting the distribution of
circumvention tools, extends criminal enforcement of copyright violations to works
not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office at the time of the violation, mandates
asset forfeiture as a sanction for infringement, and doubles the term of imprisonment
59
for offenses.
55 Macrovision, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22106, at *7 (noting that the court arrived at its holding
because Sima specifically marketed its products "for use in circumventing a [security] measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected" under the DMCA, and boasted about the devices'
capability in circumventing copy protection on copyrighted works). Defendants further argued that
the "fair use" backups were of lesser quality than the DVD itself and on par with VHS tapes, lacking
additional features such as menu functions, but the court dismissed each of these assertions as
irrelevant because the devices allowed "usable" copies to be produced by improper circumvention.
Id. See alsoMGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919.
One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party
action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the
device, regardless of the device's lawful uses.
[d.
56 Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act, H.R. 1201, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2005); see also Eric
Bangeman, Congress Gives Fair Use Legislation a Hearing, ARSTECHNICA, Nov. 16, 2005,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/ post/20051116-5589.html [hereinafter Bangeman, Congress Gives
Fair Use]. The Act was originally sponsored by Rep. Rick Boucher and backed by House Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman Rep. Joe Barton. Id. Congressional subcommittee hearings were
held in November of 2005. Id.
57See Bangeman, Congress Gives Fair Use, supra note 56 (stating that the bill has been met
with opposition by members of Congress who assert that the failure to toughen current copyright
laws will inevitably lead to widespread and large-scale piracy in the United States).
58 Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2006, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
59See Eric Bangeman, New, Tougher Copyright Legislationin the Works, ARSTECHNCA, Apr.
24, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/new.ars/post/20060424-6660.html [hereinafter Bangeman, Now,
Tougher Copyright Legislation] (stating the draft legislation was created by the Bush
administration and backed by Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr., and has garnered support from U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales as necessary to "shut down 'large-scale criminal enterprises' that
divert their profits to 'terrorism activities'); Declan McCullagh, Congress Readies Broad New
Digital Copyright Bill, NEWS.COM, Apr. 23, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6064016.html.
Other provisions of the bill include (1) the permissive use of wiretaps in investigations of copyright
crimes, trade secret theft, and economic espionage, (2) establishing a copyright unit within the FBI
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II. ANALYSIS

This section addresses three major issues that must be resolved over the next
few years. First, this section discusses the inherent flaws of AACS. Then, it
analyzes the effect of closing the analog hole on fair use rights. Finally, it is relevant
to discuss Hollywood's improper use of the DMCA and the resultant chilling effect
created by such use.

A. ImplementingAA CS Copy-Protection Technologies Spells Trouble for Consumers
The

conception

of revolutionary

entertainment

technologies

marked

a

recurring trend during the last century of audio and video entertainment. 60 Content
providers often lament breakthrough technologies that allegedly infringe upon their
right to retain complete ownership and control over public content. 61 Historically,
the content providers sought refuge from Congress, pleading with the legislature to
either curb the permitted uses of such technologies, or completely prohibit the sale
and use of such technologies altogether. 62 In reality, the content providers presented
nothing more than baseless arguments for why they have an undisputed right to
dominate control over their entertainment content even after sale or conveyance to
the public.

63

and budgeting twenty million dollars for topics including creating "advanced tools of forensic science
to investigate" copyright crimes, and (3) allowing copyright holders to impound "records
documenting the manufacture, sale or receipt of items involved in" infringements. Id.
60E.g., Birkmaier, supra note 2, at 14. Some notable examples include the television, the VCR,
and the remote control. Id.
61See id.(citing the recent "Sony BMG Rootkit Fiasco," in which Sony BMG sold music CDs
with DRM software that installed undisclosed hidden files onto users' Windows computers, exposing
them to malicious attacks by third parties, and also communicating back to Sony BMG about the
customers' computer use without proper notification). The EFF successfully sued Sony BMG,
forcing them to withdraw the spyware technology from the market and compensate all affected
consumers. [d.;
see aso Ed Felten, The DMCA Should Not Protect Spywar, Dec. 2, 2005,
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=938 (discussing Felten's attempt to ask the Copyright Office to
grant a DMCA exemption for the circumvention of CD copy protection technologies that have certain
"spyware-ish features" or create security holes, despite the fact that the Copyright Office has always
found excuses for not granting exemptions in the past). Cf J. Alex Halderman, Hidden Featurein
Sony DRM Uses Open Source Code to Add Apple DRK, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.freedom-totinker.com/?p =940 (arguing that Sony's hidden XCP copy protection system deliberately copied
Halderman's "DRMS" program to convert unprotected audio files into proprietary Apple FairPlay
files compatible with the iPod).
2 Birkmaier, supra note 2, at 14. "Each time emerging technologies threaten its dominance of
the markets for the creation and distribution of entertainment for the masses, the group runs to
Washington feigning the need for CPR." Id.
63 Id. The controversial trend mentioned has humorously been termed the "Content Protection
Racket" ("CPR") by fair use pundits, referencing the manner in which the content providers "feign
heart attacks and beg politicians for [cardiopulmonary resuscitation]" in order to remedy their
allegedly dire situation. Id. See also Fred von Lohmann, AACS- More Useless DRM,THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Apr. 19, 2005, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/
003513.php [hereinafter Von Lohmann, More Useless DRA (arguing that the film industry's
hunger for control and domination over the next-gen DVD player market led them to implement the
AACS to pressure manufacturers into obedience).
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The content providers assumed most everyday consumers could not be trusted
any more than a common thief looking to profit from a loophole created by a new
technology.6 4 The three enactments intended to deter consumers from copying
digitally broadcasted signals are managed copy, ICT, and DOT, as mandated by
AACS.65

1. AA CS's Version of Managed Copy Subversively Cripples Content
The concept of managed copy, which allows consumers to seamlessly transfer
copy-protected content between media devices, is well-intentioned.6 6 However, the
implementation of the managed copy feature does not retain its non-burdensome
essence as originally conceived. Under managed copy, AACS grants the consumer
the privilege to make at least one copy of content, subject to a convoluted
67
authorization and monitoring procedure administered over a network connection.
AACS's version of managed copy does not comport with the essence of
68
interoperability among multiple devices, as the common fair use doctrine dictates.
The fair use exception normally includes the right to copy a lawfully obtained
copyrighted work for one's own personal use.6 9 Therefore, as applied to managed
copy, AACS's version of managed copy infringes consumers' fair use rights by
improperly restricting the copying of purchased content. It mandates an "always-on"
network, which polices what is copied through unreasonable charges on degraded or
70
incomplete content.

Birkmaier, supra note 2, at 14.
See generally Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14 (delineating the associated implications of the
proposed managed copy, ICT, and DOT schemes).
66 See generally Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14 (describing how a consumer would obtain
permission to copy copyrighted content through the managed copy scheme).
67 Talks Plod On Toward FinalAA CS License, Now Delayed to Nov., CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
DAILY, July 31, 2006. Some content providers will only permit the copying of selected portions of the
original, instead of the full version. Id.
68 See generallyYoshida, supra note 6, at 14 (describing how AACS's version of managed copy
64
6

intends to operate); see also Robin D. Gross, UnderstandingYour Rights: The Public'sRikht of Fair
Use, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://dvdxcopy.afterdawn.com/thread-view.cfm/
256296 [hereinafter Gross, Understanding Your Rights]. Fair use is a judicially-created exception
created within copyright law, allowing consumers to "use copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without the consent of [the] copyright owner," as long as the use does not substantially
deprive the copyright owner of income, or if the use is done for purposes of commentary and/or
criticism. Id. See also Chapter 9. Fair Use, COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE: STANFORD UNIVERSITY
LIBRARIES,
2003,
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright-andFairUseOverview/chapter9/
index.html; A. What Is FairUse? COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE: STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES, 2003,
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright-and-FairUseOverview/chapter9/9-a.html
(reasoning that
since the judges and lawmakers who created the fair use exception did not intend for its definition to
be limited, it is a subjective standard that is open to broad interpretation by the courts); B.
MeasuringFair Use: The Four Factors,COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE: STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES,
2003, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright-and-Fair_ UseOverview/chapter9/9-b.html.

69Gross, UnderstandingYour Rights, supra note 68.
70 Talks Plod On Toward FinalAA CS License, Now Delayed to Nov.,
DAILY, July 31, 2006.

CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
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2. The ICT and DOT Technologies Will Impede WidespreadHDTVAdoption
The ICT and DOT technologies intend to close the analog hole by deliberately
downgrading ("downrezzing") or eliminating the option to view digital content over
analog connections. However, such technologies create unfair burdens upon general,
law-abiding consumers. Unbeknownst to the three to six million Americans who own
high-definition televisions ("HDTV") lacking an HDMI input, their televisions will be
rendered inoperable with HDCP if technologies such as ICT or DOT are implemented
in the near future.7 1
While Hollywood studios and consumer electronics
manufacturers have publicly advertised their products as "future proof," they have
neglected to properly inform potential HDTV buyers of the implications of future
AACS implementation.' 2 Thus, while the majority of America has yet to adopt the
HD standard by purchasing new HDTVs, they are in for an unpleasant surprise once
they purchase their allegedly "future-proof' devices and find major obstacles in the
73
form of HDCP and ICT incompatibility.
The forthcoming situation is a formula for disaster if or when AACS is
implemented because early adopters initially purchased high-definition displays with
the reasonable expectation of viewing full high-definition over the entire economic
lifetime of the televisions. Those early adopters will be sorely disappointed and
frustrated when they realize the crippling effects of ICT and DOT.7 4 Ironically, these
consumers are the same early adopters that both BD and HD-DVD will need to gain
75
favor with in order to survive as viable successors to the DVD in the near future.
Thus, movie studios should not exercise their option to implement the AACS flags if
they hope to maintain any consumer goodwill and support for the next-generation
76
formats.

71 Block, Hollywood Agrees to Postpone, supra note 17.
72 Id.
(urging studios such as Sony and Universal to issue

a definitive public statement on the
future of HD-DVD and BD in reference to the use of the ICT if they hope for the new formats to be
successful in the long run).
73Id. (remarking how AACS encryption and HDCP hardware have been utterly "mismanaged,
disjointed, and overtly anti-consumer" from their first inceptions).
74 Downeonversion Mandated for Analog Output from Blu-ray, HD-DVD, CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS DAILY, Jan. 25, 2006.

75Id. (estimating that an installed base of 6.6 million owners have spent a total of $16.5 billion
on analog-input-only HD displays thus far).
76 Yoshida, supra note 6, at 14. Whether future AACS-enabled devices will be enabled to be
backwards-compatible with previous versions of AACS, or the bigger issue of how the consumer
market will react to increasingly restrictive copy-protection regimes are the major concerns because

if the AACS system fails to garner support, Hollywood studios will not suffer as much as the
consumer. Id. The studios are more than willing to take this risk because they have nothing to lose
but the consumer goodwill, with the goal of apparently "protecting their content." Id. See also
Kevin Coughlin, High-def drama over new format for DVDs, THE TORONTO STAR, May 1, 2006, at
C04 (citing remarkable statistics about how "one in four U.S. homes - 24 million households currently owns an HDTV, according to the Consumer Electronics Association ("CEA")" and that it
"anticipates 600,000 next-generation DVD players will be sold [in 2006], with sales of 4 million units
by 2009").
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B. The Analog Hole 'Problem"Is Not The Real Problem
The "analog hole," which the film industry attempted to stigmatize by proposing
the DTSCA to Congress, is a legitimate means by which consumers may fully
exercise their fair use rights to copy and time-shift digital content. 77 In the same way
the entertainment industry previously argued against legally affirmed uses of
computer video and sound cards to capture outside sources by analog means, the
78
industry now renews its attempt to enforce DRM against the same legitimate uses.
Dan Glickman, the chairman and CEO of the MPAA, argued against the analog hole
by stating, "[p]irating DVD's is more lucrative than selling heroin for many criminal
gangs" and the implementation of DRM technologies "offer[s] consumers a wider
array of choices for enjoying the content" the film industry produces.'9 However, Mr.
Glickman refuses to acknowledge that closing the analog hole will, in fact, affect far
more legitimate end users who legally record video programming for their own
personal or educational use, rather than illegal commercial pirates in "criminal
80
gangs."
Furthermore, the film industry fails to acknowledge that consumers might
prefer fewer and simpler choices for enjoying content if it results in diminished
concern over DRM restrictions that discourage interoperability between devices and
force consumers to buy new HDCP-compliant equipment.8 1 Those DRM restrictions
may compel consumers to make multiple purchases of a particular movie or song,
with no guarantee the media will remain playable in the future if the customer does
not retain a subscription, or if the provider decides to abandon the format.8 2 Indeed,
the film industry holds little regard for the fair use rights of its constituents,
dismissively labeling such costs and concerns as "mere inconveniences" for the
83
consumer.
77 Hollywood

Versus

The

Analog Hole,

THE

ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER

FOUNDATION,

http://www.eff.org/IP/analoghole/ [hereinafter Hollywood Versus The Analog Hole].
7SMicrosoft Sells Out the Public on CGMS-A, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
27, 2005, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/003807.php [hereinafter Microsoft Sells Oud.

July

79Glickman, supra note 22.
80 Ken Fisher, The problem with MPAAs shocking piracy numbers, ARSTECHNICA, May 5,
2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060505-6761.html [hereinafter Fisher, ShockingPiracy

Numbers]. Fisher reasons that the MPAA-cited figure of $6.1 billion "lost" to piracy is highly
inflated because the MPAA counted "personal non-commercial backups and transformative 'ripping'
as [soft] piracy." Id. Thus, Fisher notes that "what most of us consider Fair Use is being marked as
piracy" by both the MPAA and RIAA. Id. Fisher also notes that sixty-two percent of this type of
piracy is done outside of the U.S. because of the DMCA, and Internet downloading represents $2.3
billion in "losses," with international piracy making up eighty percent of such losses. Id. See also
Derek Slater, Who lrTled TiVoToGo?: Digital Cable and Satellite DRM Harms TV Fans and
Innovatrs, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/IP/pnp/cablewp.php
(stating that technological innovators like Tivo "cannot lawfully build devices that receive content
through digital inputs and unlock the DRM unless they get permission to do so" under the current
DMCA provisions).
81 The Customer Is Always Wrong: A Users Guide to DRM in Online Music, THE ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/guide/ (providing examples of how the major
music services try to obscure the restrictions imposed on the consumer with clever marketing).
82 d
83

Fred von Lohmann, DMCA Triennial Rulemaking: FaiHng the Digital Consumer, THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/copyrightoffice/

[6:525 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

In fact, it is reasonable to positively assert that DRM does not actually stop
Internet piracy.s4 Every form of DRM is inevitably hacked and although everyday
consumers do not always know of these hacks, they are given incentive to seek and
discover such "workarounds" when they realize their fair use is unreasonably
restricted.8 5 Hollywood refuses to acknowledge that lost profits are predominantly a
result of commercial piracy, rather than fair use copying, because it must justify its
"compelling rationale" for burdening content with DRM.8 6

For years, Hollywood refuted criticism of DRM's negative effect on personal fair
use rights by suggesting "the public can still use analog outputs to make slightlydegraded copies of works for fair use purposes" while concurrently condemning such
practices as a serious "analog hole" problem.8 7 These arguments are entirely
hypocritical and undermine any semblance of concern for consumers' personal fair
88
use rights.

DMCA rulemaking broken.pdf [hereinafter Von Lohmann, Failing the Digital Consume] (stating
that the Copyright Office considers it a "mere inconvenience" for consumers to purchase multiple
DVD players from multiple regions to play different region-encoded discs; the inability to play copyprotected CDs on certain computers is also considered another "mere inconvenience").
84
Digital
Video
Restrictions, THE
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION,
http://www.eff.org/IP/digitalvideo/; see also Ed Felten, NextGen DVD Encryption:Better, but Won't
Stop Filesharing Apr. 18, 2005, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/index.php?p=800 [hereinafter
Felten, Better, but Won't Stop Filesharing] (stating that AACS will limit competition among
manufacturers without actually reducing infringement through filesharing because a licensing
authority will never be able to blacklist a compromised DevicelD without actually obtaining a copy
of the player).
85 Antony Bruno, Digital rights in question as business mode], BILLBOARD, Oct. 15, 2006; see
also Glickman, supra note 22. Glickman himself states that "committed pirates will break any
security measure we can devise" and follows it with the assertion that "the economic impact of a
thousand otherwise law abiding citizens making an extra copy of a movie they purchased and
[shared] with a friend [equals the] impact [of] a single commercial pirate selling a thousand copies of
a movie on a street corner." Id.
8 Fisher, Shocking PiracyNumbers, supra note 80 (reporting that the MPAA's losses due to
hard piracy, often involving organized crime and illegal distribution, were the greatest among all
types of piracy, estimated at $2.4 billion);
see also Bruno, supra note 85 (stating that the film and music industry puts forth the notion
that the DRMs will most benefit the artists or labels when instead, they force consumers to buy
proprietary hardware that mostly benefits software companies). Implementing burdensome DRMs
gives further incentive for an increasing number of frustrated consumers to seek out illegitimate
means of exercising their legitimate rights. Id.
87 Microsoft Sells Out, supra note 78. "The same recording techniques that movie studios
hailed as the protection for fair use were also stigmatized as an intolerable escape from the
supposedly perfectly controlled world of DRM." Id.
88 See id.
Although the proposed CGMSA compliance is still voluntary on the part of
manufacturers, the movie studios have openly portrayed non-complying devices as banned by
Congress, excluding such manufacturers from the Windows multimedia market. Id. These
manufacturers find it incredibly difficult to turn a profit without participating in Microsoft's
compatibility and logo-branding programs. id. It shows that Microsoft has sided with the studios in
the war against end users. Id.
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C.Hollywood's Lucrative Litigation TacticsAre EnabledBy Broad DMCA Provisions
and Enforcement
Hollywood apparently insisted on implementing anti-piracy technology that is
substantially harder to crack than the CSS system used in DVDs today.8 9 Recording
studios chose AACS because manufacturers can easily revoke a device's key rights
when a select player is compromised. 90 However, with such a system in place,
individuals who distribute cracked media over peer-to-peer ("P2P") networks are
immune to detection, because it is impossible to determine a compromised device key
from the compressed files normally posted to P2P networks. 91 Thus, if AACS's
92
purpose was to slow "digital piracy" through P2P networks, it has completely failed.
Furthermore, the well-documented weakness in the HDCP cryptographic
scheme allowing it to be cracked in the near future raises serious questions as to why
its designers made the seemingly deliberate choice to implement such a weak system
instead of a more secure one. 93 Professor Ed Felten suggests that HDCP security
technology was not chosen to disable pirates, but to enable lawsuits. 94 This
explanation is sensible in light of the film industry's heavy litigation in the area of
DMCA infringement violations, as evidenced by how the film industry attributes its
declining DVD profit margins to the P2P Internet piracy market. 95 The "earnings"
from several lawsuit settlements or judgments could go a long way in recouping any
alleged lost profit margins from declining DVD sales. Notably, spending slightly
more to implement a superior cryptographic scheme is counter-intuitive with the
litigation incentive because it reduces the amount of potential P2P infringement in
96
the long run, leading to less profitable litigation to pursue.

89 Don Labriola, Battle of the New DVDs: Next Generation DVD Technology has finally
arrived. But which format will work better for you - Blu-ray or HD-DVD, PCMAG.COM, Sept. 13,
2006, http://www.pemag.com/article2/0,1895,2015177,00.asp.
90Id., see also Felten, Better, but Won't Stop Filesharing,supra note 84 (revealing how the
central licensing authority, which hands out DevicelDs and keys in next-generation disc players, can
control who can make players by maintaining a blacklist of"compromised" DevicelDs).
91Von Lohmann, More Useless DRM, supra note 63 (citing an example of how one smart
hacker in Moldova could extract the key from a licensed player, use the key to rip movies from HDDVDs, and post the resulting files to a P2P network, without fear of having his key deactivated
because the licensing administrators have no way of figuring out what device key he used).
92 See id. (surmising that the real reason behind AACS is to give the "Hollywood Cartel more
power over the market for next-gen DVD players" in case a manufacturer is in non-compliance or
fails to pay AACS royalties).
9 Felten, Why So Weak?, supra note 35; see also Crosby, supra note 35 (estimating that a more

secure copy-protection scheme would require about 20,000 more gates to build a digital chip
incurring minimal cost, based on what the HDCP cost to make); Felten, HDCP Could Have Been
Bette±r supra note 35 (stating the well-known "offline Diffie-Hellman algorithm" was the more
logical choice given its higher level of security).
91 Felten, Why So Weak?, supra note 35. Felten notes that while "uncompressed super highdef (1080i) video blasts so much data so fast that there's no affordable way for a would-be pirate to
capture it" as of today, HDCP as a "temporary piracy prevention [measure] doesn't seem like a good
explanation" for sticking with it. Id.
9 See Fisher, ShockingPiracyNumbers, supranote 80 (stating that the MPAA deems Internet
downloading to be the real threat to their profits).
96 Felten, Why So Weak?, supra note 35.
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In accord with this theory, if HDCP encryption is indeed only a "hook on which
to hang lawsuits," the DMCA is the engine powering the litigation wagon. 97 Without
the DMCA's broad anti-trafficking provisions, the MPAA is unlikely to succeed on the
vast majority of its suits against DMCA infringers, such as Reimerdes and 321
Studios. 98 Thus, it would then be wise to spend the extra money and effort required
to implement the more secure cryptographic scheme, instead of offering HDCP as a
token gesture disguised as a genuine effort to protect high-definition media from
decryption and online piracy.
The DMCA's broad application also chills legitimate free expression and
scientific research in the United States, as evidenced by legal threats to Professor Ed
Felten's team of researchers and the prosecution of Russian programmer Dmitry
Sklyarov. 99 The DMCA-induced censorship caused American and foreign security
experts to refrain from publishing details of their research at key U.S. conferences,
stunting the continued prosperity of computer security within the United States. 00
A fear of prosecution is not unfounded given the history of broad DMCA enforcement
and prosecution by our courts and is thus a good reason to look to DMCA reform to
mitigate the harsh effects it has wrought.10 1

III. PROPOSAL
This section proposes several initiatives Congress and entertainment content
owners must implement to remedy the digital piracy issue. First, the entertainment
industry must establish a digital marketplace that provides consumers legitimate
alternatives to illegal piracy.
In addition, Congress must reject analog hole
legislation that impermissibly encroaches upon consumers' fair use rights. Finally,
the DMCA must be amended to enable lawful uses of legitimately acquired content.

A. The DigitalMarketplace Solution
The implementation of AACS copy-protection technologies will not effectively
stem the tide of digital piracy, but will instead infuriate scores of consumers who
already own equipment that is not HDCP-compliant. Alternatively, the movie and
music industry must completely shift its mentality and methodology by exerting its
efforts (and dollars) to fully implement digital marketplace solutions, similar to

97 Id.
98 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, No. 03CV8970 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3306
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004); see also Hollywood Versus The Analog Hole, supra note 77. If consumers
were permitted to lawfully use DeCSS software to make legitimate copies of lawfully purchased
movies, they would be able to transfer them onto their video iPods for personal use. Id.
99 Unintended Consequences: Seven Years under the DMCA, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, Apr. 2006, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended-consequences.php[hereinafter
UnintendedConsequences].

100 Id.
101Id.
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Apple, Inc.'s "iTunes Music Store," whereby consumers may freely purchase and fully
10 2
own content via legitimate means.
Chris Cookson, President of Warner Bros. Technical Operations correctly stated
that "most customers will respect copyrights when the content offer[ed] is perceived
as fair and a good value, the content offer[ed] is easy to use, [and] the quality of
service meets the consumer's needs and expectations, .".."103
However, Mr. Cookson
incorrectly declared that "there is no marketplace solution." 10 4 One need look no
further than the roaring success of the iTunes business model to acknowledge that if
content providers make their catalogues available in an easily accessible, flexible,
and reasonably priced manner, the digital marketplace model will succeed without
governmental intervention.10 5 As of October 2006, legal downloads represented about
eleven percent of total music sales, while total music sales declined four percent in
the first half of 2006.106 However, John Kennedy, chairman and CEO of the
International Federation of the Phonographic Industries ("IFPI"), expressed hope
that digital music sales could potentially recoup the losses incurred in physical
format sales by 2007.107 If Mr. Kennedy's prediction comes to fruition within a year's
span, it should provide Hollywood with clear and convincing evidence that it needs to
refocus its efforts on delivering legitimate content via digital means instead of
concerning itself with the implementation of ineffective and expensive AACS
technologies. Those technologies serve no long-term purpose other than to hamper

102 Apple, Inc.'s iTunes Music Store (http://www.apple.com/itunes/store) debuted on April 28,
2003, as the first online music store to garner worldwide commercial success. Apple iTunes Store,
APPLECOM, 2007, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/. After initially launching with about 200,000
songs available for download, the store now boasts more than 3.5 million songs available for
purchase at ninety-nine cents per song, as well as 65,000 free podcasts, 20,000 audiobooks, 200 TV
shows, and a large selection of movies and games. Id.
103 Cookson, supra note 22. Cookson further declares that one of the movie studio's primary
goals is to offer its content in as many legitimate ways as possible "so that the consumer can choose
when, where, and how to enjoy it." Id.
104 Id. (stating that the tech industry generally agrees that there is no marketplace solution
available to combat exploitation of the analog hole, and thus far, none have been suggested).
1051
Sohn, supra note 34. Sohn herself contends that the most effective means of preventing
massive copyright infringement involves satisfying market demand by allowing consumers to enjoy

fair and flexible access to content at reasonable prices. Id. She uses the DVD market as an example
by illustrating how the fledgling DVD market grew from zero sales in 1997 to an astounding twentyfive billion dollars in sales and rentals by 2005, despite the fact that its CSS protection system was
cracked long ago. Id. Finally, she states that government intervention in the free market is entirely
unnecessary because of the emergence of new digital music and video distribution models in the
market. Id.
106 Kate Holton, Music industry in 8 000 new file-share lawsuits, THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD,
Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c-id=5&objectid=10406453.
107 Soo id. (labeling the goal of making up for declining CD sales through digital sales as the
"holy grail" for the music industry). The IFPI represents the world's music companies and has filed
approximately 18,000 lawsuits in the United States, which is the largest market for music sales, and
13,000 suits in the rest of the world. Id. IFPI estimates that twenty billion songs were illegally
downloaded worldwide last year, and more than 2,300 people have already settled the suits filed
against them for about $3,034 each. Id. Kennedy believes that the proliferation of high-speed
broadband, coupled with the threat of legal action and vulnerability to computer viruses, has caused
more users to opt for legal online services instead of P2P networks. Id.
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the growth of the high-definition consumer market under the pretense of content
108
security measures.
Furthermore, the content sold in the digital marketplace must be entirely
interoperable with multiple devices because people dislike being restricted to one
media device without the ability to transfer content to other playback devices. 10 9 In
this regard, the content should be offered without the burdens of DRM protection,
which unjustly forces consumers to buy hardware with proprietary technologies and
often prevents them from enjoying the content on incompatible devices. 110 Also, if the
marketplace hopes to garner initial interest from a skeptical public, it must
guarantee high quality content at a relatively low price in order to compete with the
fee-free offerings readily available on P2P networks. Essentially, the film industry
needs to determine an optimal licensing model for the everyday consumer and
provide content that consumers are willing to purchase on a subscription or pay-perdownload basis. 1
Although some argue that the electronic delivery of high definition content will
effectively render all physical disc formats obsolete, there will always be a need to
108 Cf Zinn, supra note 25 (stating that although the DTCSA legislation is promoted as a tool

to fight piracy, it only empowers television studios to encroach upon the consumers' flexible and fair
uses of lawfully-acquired content with no convincing justification).
109 Symposium, Licensing in the Digital Age: The Future of DigitalRights Management, 15
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1009 (2005) [hereinafter Licensing in the DigitalAge].
Marybeth Peters, from the Register of Copyrights, states that users should not have to worry about
incompatibilities of media based on the type of DRM assigned to it because it should all be fully
interoperable. Id.
10 See, e.g., Bruno, supra note 85. Bruno argues that if the music industry seeks any hope of
loosening Apple's "iron grip" on digital music sales, it must start selling its music without DRM
protection. Id. Bruno offers the eMusic service as an example of a success story, because even
though its entire music catalog was limited to predominantly independent labels, it sold more music
downloads than any other service outside of iTunes because all of the music was offered as
unprotected MP3s. Id. David Goldberg, the General Manager of Yahoo Music, argues that DRM
really "does nothing to protect music" and although it can serve as a "speed bump" to discourage
people from illegal behavior, DRM just makes it harder for "people who want to do the right thing to
get the music they legitimately purchased on the devices and services they want." id. Thus, the
difficulties caused by DRM often deter consumers from purchasing music legally, ironically keeping
illegal P2P enterprises in business. Id. See also Von Lohmann, Darknet,supra note 36, at 635-38
(arguing that DRM is not only futile in a P2P world, but actually counterproductive because it drives
otherwise legitimate customers to the "Darknet"); see also Von Lohmann, More Useless DRM, supra
note 63 (arguing that content owners are using DRM to "punish the innocent in the hope of
pressuring player makers into obedience, all the while doing nothing to slow file sharing").
III See Licensing in the DigitalAge, supra note 109, at 1017. Peters lists several qualms that
most people have with digital marketplaces-namely, controls on e-books, being tied to one
particular machine without the ability to move content to another machine, desirable features that
are disabled, subscription models, and paying every time you download. Id. Peters then contrasts
the millions of songs licensed by iTunes with the billions of songs that are illegally downloaded to
show that the music industry is slowly making progress, but has a ways to go in determining what
terms and conditions consumers are willing to accept. Id. Cf Gross, Court Upholds Right to Digital
Music, supra note 54. Although the RIAA continues to operate under its self-important assumption
that only it is capable of providing a "legitimate" marketplace for music on the Internet, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit balked at this notion in Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) when reasoning that the Internet
"supports a burgeoning traffic in legitimate audio computer files" routinely sold or provided free of
charge by independent and wholly Internet record labels, or by many unsigned artists. Id.
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redundantly archive and backup media on disc-based optical formats because of the
112
need to preserve the content for long-term home use.
As Cookson himself stated, "mandates on technology [such as AACS] should be a
last resort and used only when a marketplace solution cannot be found." 113 It is
readily apparent that a viable digital marketplace solution is ripe to be fully
exploited by the movie studios.

B. Closing the Analog Hole Eviscerates Fair Use Rights
The fair use doctrine allows individuals to make a copy of legitimately
obtained copyrighted work for their own personal use. 114 However, there is little
evidence the analog hole is actually contributing to the mass redistribution of content
over the Internet, and even less evidence it contributes to the redistribution of HDTV
content. 115 Any legislation seeking to close the analog hole excessively encroaches
upon the "private, noncommercial, in-home conduct" that consumers have
legitimately exercised for decades. 116 In its landmark Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios decision, the U.S. Supreme Court conclusively deemed "timeshifting" using a VCR a fair use. 117 Thus, federal technology mandates such as the
proposed DTSCA must be thwarted in order to protect consumers' fair use rights.

112 Michael Heiss, OpticalDisc-orama. Why Blue-Laser Format Wars andEven Confusion Over
"Red-Laser"DVDPlayer Options are Good fori Business, RESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS, Sept. 1, 2006, at 96.
Even with the global proliferation of broadband, there are still places where physical media is the
only means to carry and playback sound and images. Id. Thus, DVDs and other forms of magnetic
and solid state storage in both SD (red laser) and HD (blue laser) formats will undoubtedly be in
widespread use for generations to come. Id. Cf Coughlin, supra note 76, at C04 (stating that BD
and HD-DVD delays and complications may cause "baffled consumers" to instead download highdefinition movies from cable, satellite, and Internet services, or even onto their cell phones).
113Cookson, supra note 22.
114 Gross, Understanding Your Rights, supra note 68. The fair use doctrine also allows an
individual to make a backup copy of their discs in order to protect against loss in the event of a
future media failure. Id. Furthermore, "format shifting" is also permissible as a form of personal
use, because it allows music fans to make compilations of their favorite songs from their own music
collection or the radio. Id. However, uploading and sharing one's music or video collections over the
Internet falls well outside the realm of fair use. Id.
11H5
See Shapiro, supra note 30 (citing revealing evidence pulled directly from the MPAA's own
website, showing that the analog hole has not been a major source of pirated material).
116 Id. Because it is likely that analog hole legislation does more harm than good, its
supporters have the burden of tangibly demonstrating that it is truly imperative to combat piracy,
in light of the high potential for negative and unintended consequences. Id.
117 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (2000).
The U.S.
Supreme Court weighed the fair use factors in an "equitable rule of reason" balancing test to hold
that the use of Sony's VCR to "time-shift" freely broadcast television programs was a fair use,
reversing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
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C. DMCA Reform to Enable Lawful Uses of Content
Since its ratification in 1998, the DMCA has notably chilled free expression and
scientific research in the United States. 118 Furthermore, in the context of the
triennial DMCA rulemaking procedure, the Copyright Office has repeatedly refused
to grant exemptions to the Act and improperly stymied fair use jurisprudence by
arrogating to itself the power to define the metes and bounds of the fair use
exception. 119 Although Congress codified the fair use doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 107, it
was originally created by the courts as an equitable and flexible exception to the
copyright monopoly. 120 Therefore, if a new consumer activity potentially falls under
the fair use exception, the Copyright Office must grant a three-year DMCA
exemption, allowing the courts to fully develop the fair use doctrine in the twentyfirst century. 121 To remedy the dilemma surrounding the DMCA, Congress must
122
amend the Act to allow limited circumvention for non-infringing purposes.
Furthermore, in order to grant consumers access to the tools necessary to
exercise non-infringing uses of copy-protected digital media products, Congress must
also reform the DMCA's ban on the distribution of circumvention tools.

123

A narrowly

tailored law such as the DMCRA accomplishes both purposes and preserves fair use
rights for the digital age. 124 Such an amendment creates just enough leeway for
consumers to engage in legal circumvention for the sole purpose of lawfully using the

118

Unintended Consequences, supranote 99.

11) Von Lohmann, Failing the Digital Consumer, supra note 83; see, e.g., id.

In 2003, the
Copyright Office opined that "space-shifting" (making personal use of an e-book, DVD, or CD in
order to enjoy them on multiple devices) does not qualify as a fair use. Id. It also concluded that
'making personal backup copies of DVDs would not qualify as a fair use" either because "such
reproductions of convenience are infringing under the Copyright Act." Id. But see Recording Indus.
Ass'n of Am., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding the consumers' right to "space-shift"
copyrighted music for their personal use); Ed Felten, The DMCA Should Not ProtectSpyware, Dec.
2, 2005, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=938 (reasoning that the Copyright Office often tries so
hard to find excuses not to grant exemptions that there is almost no point in asking for one in the
first place).
120 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996).
"Fair use is one of the most unsettled areas of the law." Id. at 1392. See also Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that the fair use doctrine is "entirely
equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d
661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (declaring the fair use issue as "the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright").
121 Von Lohmann, Failing the Digital Consumer, supra note 83.
In the context of DMCA
rulemaking, the Copyright Office must liberally construe consumer fair use claims, erring on the
side of approving exemptions, in order to allow the courts to fulfill their duty of interpreting fair use
principles as applied to "new, noncommercial, personal-use consumer activities." Id. Without such
an exemption, digital consumers may be found liable for circumvention without due process, because
they will be denied their "day in court" to present their fair use claims. Id.
122 See id. (stating that Rep. Barton and Rep. Boucher both support the DMCRA, H.R. 1201,
still pending before the 109th Congress).
123 Id.
124 Sohn, supra note 34. Sohn declares that "technology mandates ... are misguided industrial
policies that would constitute a radical expansion of the FCC's powers while radically diminishing
consumers' rights." Id. See also Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act, H.R. 1201, 107th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2005); Eric Bangeman, Congress Gives FairUse, supranote 56.
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content, such as transporting legitimately purchased content from one device to
125
another.
Critics of the proposed legislation contend it constitutes an open invitation to
engage in illegal piracy whenever one desires. 126 However, commercial pirates do not
need a fair use exception to engage in their illegal activity, and regardless of the state
127
of the law, pirates will remain subject to the full penalties of U.S. copyright law.
The DMCRA only tolerates lawful activity within the bounds of fair use. Thus, the
DMCRA is narrowly focused on permitting only lawful personal uses of legitimatelyacquired content, exclusive of illegal P2P file sharing.

IV. CONCLUSION
The gradual introduction of uncompressed, high definition video to the American
public will dramatically accelerate over the next few years with the proliferation of
the BD and HD-DVD formats, along with a slew of new HDCP-compliant devices.
New technologies often lead to concerted efforts by copyright owners to petition
Congress or enact "self-help" security measures in an attempt to retain full control
over their copyrighted material.1 28 In the digital realm, AACS and the HDCP
cryptographic system are the culprits, while in the analog realm, Macrovision's ACP
is the placeholder.
However, despite content owners' open and contradictory statements, it is
unreasonable to believe that any of these security measures are actually intended to
1 29
combat piracy, given the well-documented flaws inherent in each of these systems.
If one realizes the hypocrisy behind Hollywood's deceptive statements, it is apparent
that content owners seek to squelch consumers' fair use rights for one reason alone:

125 Soo Licensing in the DigitalAgo, supra note 109, at 1016; see also Zinn, supra note 25.
Zinn argues the DTCSA (H.R. 4569) only allows Tivo users to make a single copy of most content,
and that they will no longer be authorized to copy a television program from a Tivo DVR in the
living room to one in the bedroom, or to their laptops or portable devices for later viewing. [d. All
these actions are currently lawful and permissible under U.S. copyright law, and the studios have
not provided any justification for proving otherwise. Id.
126 Sohn, supra note 34.
127 Id.
Sohn argues that closing the analog hole will immediately restrict lawful uses of

technology and make millions of consumer devices (i.e. Analog-to-digital converter boxes) obsolete.
d. Instead, the industry must use "legal, technological, and marketplace tools" to combat illegal use
of P2P networks. Id.
128 See Birkmaier, supra note 2, at 14 (noting the trend of new technologies being met with acts
of resistance and insecurity on the part of movie studios).
129 See Felten, Why So Weak supra note 35 (discussing the inherent weaknesses in the HDCP
cryptographic scheme and theories on why it was "deliberately" chosen over a more secure scheme);

see also Gerry Block, HD-D VD, Blu-ray AACS Copy ProtectionBroken:Exploit Devolopod Within 6
months of Launch.
Hackers win, but for how Long, IGN.COM, Jan. 25, 2007,
http://gear.ign.com/articles/758/758675pl.html. Within six months of the release of HD-DVD and
BD into the U.S. marketplace, the hacking community has already managed to create software that
effectively circumvents AACS, allowing 1080p rips of high-definition discs to be freely distributed
over the Internet. Id. Ironically, "[t]he process of ripping next-gen[eration] DVDs was not developed
by Chinese-pirates with replicator facilities but by activist-enthusiasts who are more interested in
being able to enjoy their media without restriction than in profit-making piracy." Id.
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to exercise maximum control over what you watch, how you watch, and when you
30
watch.1
Today, the music, film, and television industries assert a claim of entitlement to
a royalty every time a consumer listens to one of their songs, or views one of their
movies or television shows. For instance, Microsoft recently agreed to pay Universal
Music a small royalty for every Zune music player it sells. 131 At a certain point, both
Congress and the courts must act to wrest the dominance of the fair use doctrine
away from the Copyright Office in order to determine the correct balance between the
competing rights of creators and the public interest. 13 2 This is why narrowing of the
DMCA through legislation such as the DMCRA is so important, in stark contrast to
the DTCSA and IPPA propositions, which are primarily backed by those who stand to
133
profit at the expense of the consumer.
The real solution to the piracy issue is to offer consumers high quality content,
unfettered with burdensome DRM, at reasonably low prices in a digital marketplace,
1 34
giving them a simpler and safer alternative to illegal piracy over P2P networks.
Apple's iTunes model has garnered success, despite its use of proprietary DRM, and
Microsoft has followed suit with its "Video Marketplace" recently launched over its

130 Eric Bangeman, HD-DVD and Blu-ray Content to be Degraded for Analog Displays,
ARSTECHNICA, Jan. 22, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060122-6027.html (predicting a
dark future for consumers if the motion picture and music industries get their way).
131 Yinka Adegoke, Microsoft to pay Universal for Every Zune Sold, YAHOO! CANADA, Nov. 8,
2006, http://ca.news.finance.yahoo.com/09112006/6/finance-microsoft-pay-universal-zune-sold.html.
Doug Morris, CEO of Universal Music, stated, "We felt that any business that's built on the bedrock
of music we should share in," implying that they should be entitled to royalties from the sale of any
music-playing device, regardless of whether the device ever plays a song recorded by Universal. Id.
Microsoft is willing to accept the absurdity of his comment, as long as they are able to garner favor
with Universal over its direct rival, Apple Computer and its iPod. Id.
132 Gross, Understanding Your Rights, supra note 68. Copyright law must "balance the
competing rights of creators to exploit their work, entrepreneurs to receive a return on their
investment, and the public's interest in gaining access to works." Id. Ultimately, the goal of fair use
is "to encourage citizens to fully and openly exchange and build upon information to increase the

public's knowledge." Id.
133 See Eric Bangeman, New, Tougher Copyright Legislation, supra note 59; see also Gerry
Block, All HDCPs Base Are Belong To Us: CriticalFlaws in the HDCP Copy-Protection Scheme
Revealed, IGN.COM, Apr. 17, 2006, http://gear.ign.com/articles/702/702074p.html.
The hackers that break HDCP are not the criminals in this sordid tale of
consumer abuse. Technologically illiterate Hollywood executives and the equally
uneducated politicians they finance are the felons here. Preying upon Americans'
lack of knowledge on the topic, these parties, and major industry players like
Microsoft are steamrolling HDCP, even after its critical flaws were publicly
announced five years ago. The train has already left the station, and we will live
with this situation for a solid decade. Such is the price for obeying the law.
Id.
131See BitTorrent Launches Entertainment Network, IGN.COM,
Feb.
26, 2007,
http://games.ign.com/articles/767/767900pl.html (announcing the "most comprehensive library of
downloadable digital entertainment ever amassed on the Web, including content from [major movie
studios]"); cf Hilary Goldstein, DigitalDownloads the Future of Gaming Revenue, IGN.COM, Nov.
15, 2006, http://ps3.ign.com/articles/746/746275pl.html (stating that by 2010, digital downloads will
account for twenty-two percent of all [video] gaming revenue, likely producing the most profitable
generation of [gaming] consoles in videogame history).
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Xbox Live online video game service.13 5 Of course, there are many questions to be
answered regarding an appropriate licensing model, but the initiatives of Apple and
Microsoft are partial steps in the right direction.

135Erik Brudvig, Microsoft Unveils the Video Marketplaeo, IGN.COM, Nov. 6, 2006,
http://xbox360.ign.com/articles/744/744355pl.html (reporting that Microsoft launched its online
video marketplace on Nov. 22, 2006, allowing Xbox 360 owners to download a variety of high and
standard definition content to their consoles at competitive pricing); see also Tim Surette, XBL
Getting
On-Demand
HDTV
Film,
GAMESPOT.COM,
Nov.
6,
2006,
http://www.gamespot.com/news/6161165.html (reporting that television programs will be sold on the
buy-to-own basis, while movies will be delivered only on a rental basis - deleting itself twenty-four
hours after first use).
But see Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, APPLE.COM, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/ thoughtsonmusic. Steve Jobs, the iconic co-founder and CEO of
Apple Corp., himself states that Apple would wholeheartedly embrace the entire abolition of DRMs
"in a heartbeat" because "DRMs haven't [ever] worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy."
Id. He argues that removing such DRM requirements from digitally-distributed music would benefit
the music industry by creating an "influx of new companies willing to invest in innovative new
stores and players" and thus, a "truly interoperable music marketplace." Id.

